ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
During the inflationary early 1990s, housing prices in Hong Kong were volatile, yet the upward trend exceeded the rate of inflation. In the fourth quarter of 1997, the housing price of an "average" size property reached US$891 per square foot (Hong Kong Property Review) . In the same quarter, the monthly median household income in Hong Kong was only US$2500 (Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics). The strong housing demand for occupation and investment between 1989 and 1997 led to a three-fold increase in housing prices and 94 percent increase in rents. By December 2001, the "average" housing price significantly dropped by 57 percent from the 1997 peak to about US$385 per square foot (Hong Kong Property Review) . Property transactions also decreased by nearly 60 percent in the same period (Hong Kong Land Registry) . By the end of 2001, economic confidence sunk to an all-time low, even lower than after the Tiananmen unrest in China in 1989 (DeGolyer et al., 2001 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 Year The inflation rate increased from 9.8 percent in 1990 to 12.0 percent in 1991, while the mortgage interest rate dropped from 12.25 percent to 10.75 percent in the corresponding period. This equated to a decline in the real mortgage rate from 2.45 percent to -1.25 percent. The rate remained negative until March 1994. Lower capital cost was resulted from a series of reductions in interest rates in the USA throughout 2001. The Linked Exchange Rate System 1 led to a significant decrease by 11 downward increments in nominal interest rate of a total of 4.375 percent to 5.125 percent per annum in 2001 (Hong Kong Monetary Authority), one of the lowest rates in 40 years in Hong Kong (Figure 2 ).
Figure 1: Housing price & rent indices & interest rates in Hong Kong
Falling interest rates stimulated the demand for home ownership, as indeed occurred in the 1990s. However, further falling interest rates in 2001 and 2002 did not revive the market. This phenomenon does not support the proposition that low interest rates have a positive effect on both demand-and supply-side variables. This study investigates the separate effects of rising and falling interest rates on housing prices. A number of studies in Hong Kong have examined the positive effect of falling rates in inflationary periods, but few studies have been able to estimate the effect in times of deflation. This paper addresses the following questions: (a) if interest rates are a major factor affecting residential property prices, is its impact the same in periods of inflation 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: a theoretical literature on interest rates and house prices with reference to expectations is presented in the next section. It is followed by a review of expectation literature in the third section. A discussion of the data and methodology is made in the fourth section. The analysis and empirical results are presented in the fifth section, followed by the implications of the findings. Finally, the last section concludes.
THEORETICAL LITERATURE OF INTEREST RATES AND HOUSE PRICES
With perfect foresight (rational expectations), the capital value (probable selling price) of an income property represents the value of the total future income stream or services from the property to the homeowners. Future incomes are capitalised to present capital sums at an appropriate discount rate of interest or capitalisation rate. This market extracted capitalisation rate, in essence, assumes a static market with little or no change in price expectations. With perfect foresight and a well-functioning capital market, the real rate of interest may be written as the nominal interest rate less the compensation for expected inflation. This follows the relationship between nominal interest rates and real interest rates in the Irving Fisher hypothesis. That is, the nominal interest rate is approximately the sum of the ex-ante real interest rate and expected inflation. The price-expectations, or Fisher, effect is summarised in his original equation: i = r + (1/P* dP/dt) + r (1/P* dP/dt) where i is the nominal or market rate of interest, (1/P* dP/dt) is the expected rate of change of prices, r is the 'real' rate of interest. The third term on the right side is the interest that would be earned on the price adjustment to the nominal rate. This term is frequently insignificant and customarily omitted. Conceptually, the inflation component should reflect a forward-looking (rational approach) measures of expected inflation, as opposed to the backward-looking (adaptive approach) measures commonly used. Fisher posits that people form expectations by taking a weighted sum of current and past actual rates of inflation (i.e., the irrationalexpectations school of macroeconomics).
According to Fisher (1930) , interest rates are made up of three components: future time preference, risks and inflation expectations. A simple way to derive this interest rate is to add a premium onto the best lending rate. This rate represents the cost of capital, which is used to guarantee the investor that the rental income can cover the cost of borrowing. Fisher (1930) hypothesised that 'Interest rates tend to be "high" when prices are rising and "low" when prices are falling.'
Following the "user cost" concept used by Mills and Hamilton (1984) 3 , the true cost of occupying housing is modified to account for gains (losses) from inflationary (deflationary) expectations other than only the cost of interest associated with holding housing capital. This real cost of housing capital is the key element of home purchase, because high interest rates tend to add the real burden of debt payments. This user cost was given a richer urban spatial framework by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) in addressing issues related to housing price adjustments, the formation of price expectation and effects of the 3 The relationship can be expressed as:
)} where r is the real rate of interest, Π is the expected inflation rate, T is the marginal income tax rate, and g r is the expected rate of capital gains. For a house of value V and unit costs given by r, Π, T, and g r , R is the rent that must be charged to cover costs at an acceptable rate of return called the capitalization rate. Clearly, price expectations can change the magnitude of the denominator. If expectations are optimistic, high g r at times of inflation suggests the capitalization of these gains in selling the house. On the other hand, if the value of g r is small as a result of declining property appreciation, or negative arising from capital losses, home owners are reluctant to sell their houses. land factors on housing flows. Harris (1989) concluded that housing prices were affected by real interest rates. Muellauer and Murphy (1996) found that demographic changes and interest rates were two important factors causing the UK house price boom in the late 1980s. In examining the dynamics of housing prices in 130 US metropolitan areas during the 1984-1998 period, Jud and Winkler (2002) found that real housing price appreciation is strongly influenced by the growth of population, income changes, construction costs and interest rates. Tan (1994) found weak uni-directional Granger causality relationships from house prices to interest rates in Singapore, due to its rapid economic growth, public housing policies and high saving rates.
In the local market, Tse (1996) suggested that a declining real interest rate tends to stimulate housing prices. Tse (1996a) concluded that the dramatic increase in housing prices in 1991 in Hong Kong was mainly due to the expectation of rising inflation, fuelled by decreasing interest rates. Another empirical study of Tse (1996b Tse ( ) also illustrated that, during 1984 Tse ( -1994 , the interest rate under the Linked Exchange Rate System in Hong Kong had a direct effect on housing prices. In general, the studies of Tse focus on positive effects of falling interest rates on local property markets in the inflationary pre-1997 period. This study, however, points out that falling rates in times only play a supporting role. It provides additional evidence that the interaction of nominal rates and deflationary expectations, the real rate to the borrower, lowers market prices in the deflationary period after the bubble burst.
LITERATURE REVIEW ON PRICE EXPECTATIONS
Once a price begins to rise, like the early stage of the bubble, people tend to think that the previous rising trend will continue. That is, the price increase is expected. Thus, the price change reflects the expectations of the future trends. For example, Phillips (1988) demonstrated that housing price increases reflect future housing price appreciation rather than expected future increases in rental. Similar studies by Phillips (1985) and McDonald (1985) argued that expected increases in house values may bid up house prices independent of expected rents. Krashinsky and Milne (1987) noted that housing demand responds not only to current prices, but also price expectations. The models of Harris (1989) further suggested that expectations of future appreciation are important determinants of house sale prices, and these expectations remain influential even during periods of declining and moderating real prices. DiPasquale and Wheaton's (1994) model assumed that the fluctuation of prices was caused by the difference between the actual price and expected price. The important interplay between house values and expectations was also noted by Blackadar (1989) , who stated that "Market values are opinions, which are the appraiser's: the expectations are those of the marketplace".
In studying expectations of capital appreciation in the housing market, Capozza (1996) found evidence that total returns assuming that the sum of the rent and the expected capital gain were based on rational expectations. Similarly, Peng and Wheaton (1994) concluded that the appreciation of high future housing rents would be rationally capitalised into higher current housing prices. In the price equation derived by Kim and Suh (1993) , the future price was based on rational expectations (forward looking approach) included in the demand function. However, in Brown, Song and McGillivray (1997) , adaptive expectations (backward looking approach) were assumed according to the expected capital gain. Muth (1986) used the concept of expectations for the housing price change and argued that the adaptive expectations had explanatory power for the data rather than the rational expectations in the estimated results.
A considerable body of literature establishes positive effects of changes in expected inflation and interest rates on price levels. Little attempt has been made to evaluate the "real" positive effect of a falling interest rate on, and its causal relationship with, housing prices in a deflationary period in Hong Kong. This study attempts to fill this important expectation literature gap by providing comparative evidence in the local context.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This section presents: (a) the hypotheses of the study; (b) the methodology; and (c) sources of data.
Study hypotheses
For a period of falling real prices in Hong Kong, it is hypothesised that: (a) there is an inverse relationship between housing prices and nominal interest rates in times of inflation and a direct relationship in times of deflation; (b) the effect of interest rates on housing prices differs significantly in inflationary and deflationary periods; strongly on the former and weakly on the latter; and (c) there is no causal relationship between housing prices and interest rates.
Research methodology
Three procedures were used to explore the relationship between interest rates and housing prices, and to evaluate the effect of the former on the latter. First, a multivariate correlation model was used to test hypothesis (a). It was done by calculating the Pearson product-moment correlation between each pair of variables of housing price levels and nominal interest rates, real interest rates and inflation rates. Second, a regression analysis was performed to test hypothesis (b). The differing effects were found by using the equation that best represents the linear relationship between these two variables. Finally, a Granger causality test for hypothesis (c) was performed to test the presence of cause-and-effect relationships of time-series models.
The regression may be spurious if it involves non-stationary time series data. Therefore, Granger causality tests require the use of stationary time series data (Granger and Newbold, 1974) . If a variable contains a unit root, then it is nonstationary over time, following a random walk process. It may reach stationarity by differencing t times, then the variable is referred as an I(t). The test for unit roots involves the simple Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests. An ADF Test is based on the following regression equation:
where Y is the variable under estimation, ∆Y t is Y t -Y t-1 , α is the drift term, β t is the time trend with the null hypothesis of H 0 : γ = 0 (unit root exists) and its alternative hypothesis of H 1 : γ ≠ 0, n is the number of lags necessary to obtain white noise, and µ t is the white noise.
One of the assumptions of regression analysis is that the residuals for cumulative observations are uncorrelated. A common problem in time series data is the positive autocorrelation indicated by the expected value of the Durbin-Watson statistic being less than 2. Another important assumption of any time series model is that the underlying process is the same across all observations in the sample. In the study, there are two sub-periods: 1981-1997 and 1998-2001 . We need to use the Chow Test 4 (1960) for structural breaks in some or all of the parameters of a model. If we reject the null hypothesis of no differences, then there are differing slopes and intercepts of the regressions for the two neighborhood, meaning that we cannot simply "pool" the data, and ignore the neighborhood effects. If that is the case, pooling the data would be equivalent to imposing restrictions or constraints on 4 For the Chow Test, we can calculate ESS1, ESS2 and ESS3 (error sum of squared residuals) for periods 1981-1997, 1998-2001 and 1981-2001, respectively . From three regressions, we constructed the
, where N1 and N2 are observations of the periods 1981-1997 and 1998-2001, respectively and K is the number of parameters. If F is greater than F critical (or F (K, N1 + N2 -2K) ), we can reject the null hypothesis, implying regression parameters and variances of the error terms are not the same for both periods.
housing price functions to be the same for two periods, which are not true, on the parameters. It makes the least squares estimator biased and inconsistent, no matter how large the sample.
It should be noted that the time series data used in the analysis are ratio scales rather than ordinal numbers. In measuring the linear association between two variables, we selected the Pearson product moment correlation (r) as an appropriate inferential statistic for associational hypothesis. 1981-1997 and 1998-2001 . It is necessary to segregate the study period into these two sub-periods, so as to differentiate the effect originally hypothesised before and after the hand-over of Hong Kong to Mainland China on 1 July 1997 and the Asian economic crisis by end of 1997. Further, the period chosen spans over a complete "trough" and a prolonged "peak" period of the property cycle in Hong Kong. It also covers a major structural change in the financial sector associated with the linked exchange rate to the US currency. Estimation was made by least squares of "Levels of Housing Prices" on "Expected Inflation Rates", and then on "Expected Real Interest Rates" separately for the aforesaid three periods. Individual models were evaluated on the general goodness of fit, regression coefficients exhibiting the expected sign and significance of the explanatory power of the independent variables.
A Bivariate Granger Causality Test was performed to test the direction of causality in price-interest relationships for three periods. A causality running from interest rates to housing price levels may suggest that interest rate changes represent the leading impact of the information on housing prices. Granger causality is important because it allows us to analyse which variable precedes or "leads" the other, and such leading variables are extremely useful for forecasting purposes. Therefore, an examination of causal relationship between interest rates and housing prices is very important to real estate investors and real estate portfolio managers. An expanded version of a test originally developed by Granger (1969) and popularised by Sim (1972) was employed to see if real interest rates "Granger-cause" changes in housing prices. We run: 
testing for Granger causality. If the F-test is significant for Equation (2), but not for Equation (3), then we can conclude that RI "Granger causes" RP. 
Data sources

RESULTS AND FINDINGS
The empirical results of the study are as follows:
Unit root test
Results of the Unit Root (ADF) Test for stationarity are reported in Table 2 . The critical values of ADF statistics with no trend are: -3.511, -2.897, and -2.585 at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance respectively. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
In Table 2 , the null hypothesis of a unit root, in level form, is not rejected, except for Int-Rate, which is marginally rejected at the 0.05 level of significance, when the computed absolute ADF test statistics associated with the numerical coefficients of Pr, Int-Rate, Inf-Rate, and Real-Int are compared with the absolute critical "tau" values of -4.073, -3.465, and -3.250 at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels of significance. Since the Trend-Stationary Process does not succeed, the four series data were then first differenced and the Unit Root Test was re-run using the Difference Stationary Process. In this form, we can conclude to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, suggesting that the variables are basically I(1), stationary at the first-differenced level. It is also clear that the Durbin-Watson Tests were passed (the DW statistic lies between 1.59 and 2.41). We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
Correlation of variables
The linear relationships between variables were assessed. The Pearson correlations and significance levels are presented in Table 3 . Levels of housing price indices (Pr) display higher correlations with nominal interest rates (Int-Rate) in 1998-2001 than in 1981-1997 (compare 0.678 in 1998-2001 with -0.322 in 1981-1997) . This implies that low interest rates accompany low prices in the post-1997 period, as opposed to the inverse relationship in the pre-1997 period. In 1998-2001, the positive association between Pr and inflation rates (Inf-Rate) is even greater at 70 percent (0.692). However, in 1981-1997, the negative association is very weak at -9 percent (-0.089). All correlations between Pr and Int-Rate in all periods are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. It should be noted that the correlation coefficients between Int-Rates and Inf-Rates are less than 0.5 in all periods (0.396 in 1981-2001, 0.485 in 1981-1997 and 0.480 (not significant) in 1998-2001) , indicating that there is no strong linear association, or potentially harmful multi-collinearity.
For comparison and crosschecking purposes, we also computed the nonparametric Spearman correlation for 1998-2001 with a sample of only 16 quarterly data sets. The results are shown in Table 3a below. Table 3a (Spearman) and 0.678 in Table 3 (Pearson). In sum, the parametric and non-parametric correlations are consistent.
Housing prices regressed on changes in market interest rates and/or inflation rates
The results of the bivariate regression are shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Linear regression of housing prices
The regressions show that in 1981-2001, a decrease in interest rate is, in overall terms, accompanied by higher housing prices. The effect is also pronounced in the 1981-1997 sub-period. This apparent inconsistency lies in Fisher's hypothesis of "low" interest rates accompanying "low" prices. The pattern of negative coefficients of nominal interest rates is consistent with the real situation: falling interest rates stimulated property prices before 1997. The goodness of fit of the estimated price-nominal rate equations in 1981-2001 and 1981-1997 is poor, as the coefficient of determination, R 2 is very low (about 10 percent). The coefficients of nominal rates in both periods are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (p = 0.007).
An important finding is the reversal of the pre-1997 period: the post-1997 period saw a direct relationship. This is in line with the findings of Gibson (1970) and Fisher (1930) . A decrease in nominal interest rates correspondingly brought about a greater decrease in housing prices, hence a greater (and negative) impact than in the pre-1997 period. (Compare the coefficients of 22.375 in 1998-2001 with -8.614 in 1981-1997 .) The nominal interest rate accounts for about 46 percent (R 2 = 0.464) of the variance in price changes in 1998-2001. The goodness of fit is considered moderate. The estimated coefficients in the nominal rate equations are significant at the 0.01 level in all periods. Similarly, the key point lies in the fact that a decrease in inflation rates also led to a great decrease in housing prices in the post-1997 period but an increase in price in the earlier period. (Compare the coefficient of 10.767 in 1998-2001 with -3.283 in 1981-1997.) In the combined period of 1981-2001, overall, we see an inverse relationship between housing prices and inflation rates (refer to the coefficient of -6.526). Pooling the data for prices and inflation rates of these two periods is valid, since we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no differences in the parameters and variances of the error terms of these two models. The price functions of the two periods of 1981-1997 and 1998-2001 are identical, since the Chow Test, which will be discussed later, is significant at the 0.05 level.
The optimising behavior of a representative investor ensures that the equilibriumhousing price is forward looking. It depends solely on the user cost of capital, rent, and tax elements, as for other assets. In the deflationary 1998-2001, investors' hope-led expectations of housing prices and rents were weak, and thus contributed to a slow market. As there are usually small variations in interest rates and tax rates in the long run, the user cost should remain fairly stable, all others being equal. However, when the appreciation of housing price contains the bubble, expectation for advance-in-price becomes reversed in the deflationary period. Thus, the anticipated capital losses will increase the magnitude of the denominator in the user cost equation in Footnote 3, hence lowering the capital value of the income property.
On this basis, these results lead us to infer that a fall in market interest rate in 1998 -2001 would no longer stimulate housing prices, all other things being equal. The positive effect of falling interest rates has likely been offset. Nevertheless, an increase in real interest rates resulting from deflation would give rise to lower housing prices. (Note the negative coefficients (-7.510 ) in the real interest rate equation in 1998-2001 in Table 4 above). From this, it is increasingly apparent that the interaction between nominal rates (where the sign of the coefficient is indeterminate 5 ) and expectations of capital gains or losses plays an important role in the determination of housing prices.
Using the same three study periods, the dependent variable "Levels of Housing Prices" was regressed against "Nominal Interest Rates" and "Inflation Rates". The regression results are presented in Table 5 .
Again, similar to the bivariate regression, the pre-1997 period displays an inverse relationship between housing prices and nominal rates. In 1998-2001, there is, however, a positive relationship, indicating that a fall in interest rates does not actually raise property prices. Our results agree quantitatively with the general trend of low interest rates accompanying low prices in the disinflationary/ deflationary period after 1997, as opposed in the pre-1997 period. This trend is consistent with Fisher's hypothesis. With an additional explanatory variable of "Inflation Rates", the fit of the 1998-2001 estimated equation is improved to R 2 = 0.634 (compare 0.464 in Table 4 above). The coefficients of interest rates are, again, significant at the 0.05 level. It should be noted that the least squared estimators in the regression for 1998-2001 may be biased and inconsistent as we conclude to reject the null hypothesis of no structural change in the two periods of the data (see the Chow Test below). The Chow test Table 6 shows the results of the Chow test for structural breaks. Table 7 presents the results of the Granger causality tests of the variables RI and RP. From the F statistics, the null hypothesis of no causal effects running from RI to RP or RP to RI in the sample cannot be rejected in all periods when the test is fitted with Best Lending Rates as interest rates. This is in contrast to the findings of Tan's (1994) unidirectional causality running from housing prices to interest rates in Singapore. However, the causal effects running from RI to RP and from RP to RI in both 1998-2001 6 and 1981-2001 periods are supported at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively, when Saving Rates were used as a proxy of interest rate instead. Thus, these findings could be interpreted that there are no feedback effects between PR and RI, using Best Lending Rates as interest rates in Hong Kong. In the Granger sense, RI does not affect PR, nor does PR lead RI for the past two decades. The significant finding is that interest rates are not a leading impact on housing prices; in particular, falling interest rates do not necessarily stimulate property prices, especially in the post-1997 period. One would forcibly argue that the improved "affordability" of house owners (as a result of falling interest rates) have been undermined by current high unemployment and salary cuts. However, this does not provide a full explanation to the slow market from expectation perspectives as hope-led expectations have not been taken into consideration. The main cause for the current slow market is the weak expectations of housing prices and rents in Hong Kong. Low expectations discourage housing consumption and investment, and depress real asset values.
Granger causality between variables
IMPLICATIONS
This paper has investigated the role of interest rates on housing prices from expectation perspectives. Our empirical results suggest that the interest rate effect on housing prices in Hong Kong differs significantly: positive in the inflationary pre-1997 period, and negative in the deflationary post-1997 period. The negative impact is greater than the positive one after the structural shift around 1997. There also exists a higher correlation between housing prices and nominal interest rates or inflation rates in 1998-2001 relative to those in 1981-1997. Further, interest rates do not affect housing prices in the Granger sense.
It is true that "low" interest rates accompany "low" prices, originally hypothesised by Fisher. This holds true for the post-1997 period, but not in the early 1990s when the interest rates were low, coupled with fuelling expectations of continued higher inflation. This had a major positive effect on higher housing prices before 1997. The study, nonetheless, supports that lower and falling interest rates since 1998 have been strongly correlated with a low level of housing prices, the Gibson paradox, as Keynes (1930) named it. 7 One important implication of the finding is that low interest rates do not necessarily lead to higher housing prices in periods of falling real prices, all else being equal. It is particularly evidenced in times of deflation after 1997. In the long run, housing prices rise as inflation continues. Most of the fall in housing prices in the post-1997 period are attributed to weak price expectations. Investors factor possible capital losses into their willingness to buy real property. Their low expectations become self-fulfilling. The result is that weak expectations continue to exert a prompt and dampening effect on the 7 Keynes (1930) named the high correlation between aggregate level of commodity prices and interest rates the Gibson paradox (after a businessman called A. H. Gibson had written several articles on the correlation between interest rates and prices), since it seemed to contradict the prediction of classical monetary theory that the interest rate is independent of the price level.
demand for housing, and in the short run, further decreases in interest rates do not accompany higher housing prices.
CONCLUSION
In essence, price changes can be explained by the interaction of nominal rates and price expectations, the real rate to the borrower, that affects housing prices. It can be broadly concluded that the dampening effect arising from weak price expectations tends to be more substantial in the deflationary period. The total positive effect of low interest rates is offset by an expectation of capital losses among housing consumers. This is in sharp contrast with low interest rates being accompanied by higher housing prices in the pre-1997 period, as people simply expected prices to rise. Therefore, under this self-fulfilling expectations, not even the significant falls in nominal interest rates that took place in 2001 were sufficient to revive housing prices in Hong Kong, as people, again, expected housing prices continue to fall. The study suggests, however, that price expectations play a critical role in housing price fluctuations in the short run. Finally, it would seem that the interest rate alone might not be useful in predicting the level of housing prices. The movements of interest rates may occasionally give misleading signals about the direction and extent of movements in housing prices beyond rational limits.
